SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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MENTAL

In 1984, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) determined that an area of Hillsborough Township
("Township") may have been affected by subsurface ground
water contamination. 122 N.J. at 11-12, 583 A.2d at 742. In the
summer of 1984 the EPA informed the community of the possible dangers. Thereafter, the Township decided to extend its public water supply to the affected area. Prior to the clean-up, the
Township, as demanded by the EPA, adopted a mandatory ordinance requiring connection to the public water line by all affected residences. Id. at 12-13, 583 A.2d at 742.
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) included the nursery owned by Mildred and Carlo
Buonviaggio as part of the affected area. Id. at 12, 583 A.2d at
742. The Township gave the Buonviaggios three alternatives.
Id. at 13, 583 A.2d at 742. The preferred alternative included the
sealing the present well and supplying public water usage for
their house and an alternative water supply for the nursery. On
July 25, 1986, the Township negotiated a right-of-entry agreement with the Buonviaggios allowing connection to the town
water supply and sealing of the water well. Id. at 13-14, 583 A.2d
at 743. The other damages, such as the need for an alternative
water supply, were left unresolved.
On June 18, 1987, a contractor entered the Buonviaggio
farm to seal the well which would eliminate their supply of water
for nursery stock. This prompted the Buonviaggios to submit a
claim to the New Jersey Spill Fund for replacement of their irrigation system with an alternative water supply system. Id. at 1415, 583 A.2d at 743. The DEP rejected the claim filed in 1987
concluding that it was more than a year late. The Administrator
of the Spill Fund relied on an October 30, 1985, DEP letter informing the Buonviaggios of the mandatory connection ordinance and the right-of-entry agreement executed in 1986.
In an unpublished opinion, the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division concurred with the DEP decision. Id. at 15,
583 A.2d at 743. The appellate division determined that the
Buonviaggio claim was not timely filed because they should have
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reasonably discovered their damages anytime since October 30,
1985, the date of the DEP letter. Id., 583 A.2d at 746. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
matter to the DEP. Id. at 19, 583 A.2d at 746.
The supreme court's analysis focused on the interpretation
of the provision in the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (the Spill Act), N.J. Stat. Ann. sections 58:10-23.11 to
23.24 (West 1982), requiring claims against the Spill Fund to be
filed "not later than one year after the date of discovery of damage." Buonviaggio, 122 N.J. at 11, 583 A.2d at 741. Justice
O'Hern, writing for the majority, commenced the court's analysis
by discussing the history of the Spill Act. Id. at 7-11, 583 A.2d at
739-41. The court focused on the Spill Fund purpose of financing the prevention and cleanup of hazardous discharges into New
Jersey waters. Id. at 8, 583 A.2d at 740. Justice O'Hern also
noted that the DEP holds a dual-office function as both administrator of the Spill Fund and remediator of environmental damages. Id. at 10, 583 A.2d at 741.
While recognizing the DEP's difficult position, the court rejected the argument that the statute began to run with the dating
of the DEP's October 1985 letter. Id. at 15, 583 A.2d at 744.
The court observed that subsequent to that letter all parties involved continued to work together toward a solution. Id. at 1516, 583 A.2d at 744. The court held that "early negotiations concerning an environmental responsibility do not necessarily indicate the 'discovery of damages' that triggers the Spill Fund's
statute of limitations." Id. at 16, 583 A.2d at 744. Rather, Justice
O'Hern stated, the statute of limitations would have been triggered when the Buonviaggios were "officially assured" that negotiations broke down and that the damages were fixed. Id. at
16, 19, 583 A.2d at 744, 746. Based on this reasoning, the majority concluded the statute was not tolled until the DEP determined that it would not remedy the "damage with available
resources and that a claim against the Spill Fund would have to
be made." Id. at 19, 583 A.2d at 745.
Justice O'Hern admonished the DEP for failing to "make
clear to members of the public whether and when assertion of a
claim against the Spill Fund is required despite ongoing negotiations." Id. at 17, 583 A.2d at 745. Further, the justice reasoned
that allowing the claim would advance the legislative and public
policy goals for a "swift and sure [governmental] response to environmental contamination." Id. at 7, 17, 583 A.2d at 740, 745.
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Rather than requiring the Buonviaggios to sue the polluter, this
solution allows the DEP to recover Spill Fund expenditures from
the polluter in its own suit and therefore save "limited environmental and judicial resources." Id. at 18, 19, 583 A.2d at 745.
Justice O'Hern determined that the Buonviaggios "lacked clear
instructions or regulations" as to when claims must be filed. Id.
at 19, 583 A.2d at 746. Consequently, the court remanded the
case to the DEP for proceedings consistent with the Spill Act. Id.
In dissent, Justice Clifford, joined by Justice Pollock, de-clared the majority's conclusion that the Buonviaggios did not
discover their damages until the DEP's final determination as to
its remedial action made "little sense." Id. at 21, 583 A.2d at 747
(Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford argued that the
Buonviaggios discovered their damages in October, 1985, when
they were informed of the local ordinance requiring connection
to public water lines and prohibiting the usage of their well. Id.
at 20, 583 A.2d at 746 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The justice concluded, therefore, that the Buonviaggio claim was time-barred.
Id. at 20, 22, 583 A.2d at 746-47 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Buonviaggio, attempts to resolve the dispute regarding the interpretation of the
Spill Act's limitations provisions. The liberal interpretation afforded by the court to the "discovery of damages" is encouraging
to Spill Fund claimants, and in accord with New Jersey's environmentally aware climate. Unless, the DEP adopts regulations
guiding claimants when to file their claims, however, this factspecific decision will not offer real assistance.
Justice Clifford's dissent, although less sympathetic to the
claimants, is consistent with traditional interpretations of the
"discovery of damages" provision. Furthermore, without limitations, claimants would be allowed unreasonable delays in filing
their claims and the resources of the Spill Fund would likely be
exhausted. The Buonviaggio decision would then serve to defeat
rather than bolster the social remedial purposes of the New
Jersey Spill Act.
FlorinaA. Moldovan
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Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, 122 NJ. 202, 584 A.2d
784 (1991).
FUNDS -

In 1935, the South Toms River borough (Borough) acquired
title to a four-lot parcel of land, now known as Mathis Plaza. 122
N.J. at 207, 584 A.2d at 786. Two of the lots were subsequently
developed and used for commercial purposes. The other two
lots, lots one and three, remained undeveloped despite the Borough's efforts during the 1960s and 1970s to lease and commercially develop them. Id. at 208, 584 A.2d at 787. In 1974, the
Borough resolved to put Mathis Plaza to its "highest and best
use" as a commercial development and required that potential
lessors erect improvements with a minimum value of $1,000,000.
Id. at 223, 584 A.2d at 794-95. To promote the development, the
Borough enacted various municipal land use plans and a 1977
zoning map designating the Mathis Plaza parcel as part of a "Special Economic Development" zone. Id. at 208, 584 A.2d at 787.
At a time prior, the Borough had received docking fees for a pier
on lot three which was sporadically used for fishing and boat
docking. Id. at 208, 584 A.2d at 787. A war memorial was also
placed upon lot three, and the area was briefly used for Memorial
Day activities, but the lot was not maintained and the memorial
was removed prior to 1978. Id. at 208, 225, 584 A.2d at 787,
795.
In 1978, the Borough requested and received $27,500 in
Green Acres Land Acquisition and Recreation Opportunities Act
(Green Acres Act) funds to create a baseball park on municipal
property. Id. at 207, 584 A.2d at 786. In its grant application,
the Borough did not list Mathis Plaza in the required inventory of
municipal property held for recreation or conservation. Id. at
208, 584 A.2d at 787. In 1984, the Borough advertised for bids
on Mathis Plaza and accepted a sole bid from Alphonse Stanzione (Stanzione). Id. at 206, 584 A.2d at 786. Cedar Cove, Inc.
(Cedar Cove), which had submitted an untimely bid for the property, brought suit against Stanzione and the Borough. Id. Cedar
Cove challenged the sale on the grounds that, inter alia, the Borough had violated New Jersey law by failing to obtain state ap-
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proval of property sale which was held by a municipality for
conservation or recreational purposes at the time of receipt of
Green Acres Act funds. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A-47b
(West 1979)).
The trial court ruled that although the Borough had intended to utilize Mathis Plaza for commercial purposes, the actual recreational use of lot three at the time the Borough received
the Green Acres Act funds placed Mathis Plaza within the ambit
of the Green Acres Act section 47b restriction on alienation. Id.
at 209, 584 A.2d at 787. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, agreed with the trial court that actual recreational
use of the land had occurred, but reversed on the grounds that
such incidental use was insufficient to invoke the restriction. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Cedar Cove's request
for certification, and reversed. Id. at 206, 218, 584 A.2d at 786,
792 (citation omitted).
The court held that the actual recreational or conservation
use of the property, with Borough approval or authorization, at
the time of receipt of Green Acres funds rendered the property
"held by" the Borough for purposes of the section 47b restraint
on alienation. Id. at 217-18, 584 A.2d at 792. Hence, the court
ruled, any transfer of Mathis Plaza for other than recreation or
conservation purposes required state approval. Id. at 218, 584
A.2d at 792.
Writing for the majority, Justice Handler began the analysis
by reviewing the evolution of the Green Acres Act. Id. The court
observed that the NewJersey legislature enacted the Green Acres
Act to facilitate the promotion of recreation and conservation of
property by providing state funding to municipalities to assist in
the purchase and development of recreational property. Id. at
205, 584 A.2d at 785. The original provisions of the Act, Justice
Handler noted, restrained municipalities from transferring
properties which were acquired with state funds unless state approval for the transfer was given. Id. The majority added that an
inventory of existing property held for recreation or conservation
purposes must be submitted by the municipality when applying
for Green Acres grants. Id. at 208, 584 A.2d at 787. The justice
noted Green Acres Act was amended in 1975 and extended the
requirement of state approval for the transfer of any property
"held by" the municipality for recreation or conservation purposes at the time the municipality received Green Acres funds,
regardless of whether the property had been acquired with state
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funds. Id. at 205, 584 A.2d at 785. The 1975 Green Acres Act
amendment, Justice Handler asserted, supported the inference
that the legislature desired to preclude municipalities from converting existing lands to more profitable uses, while simultaneously using state funds to acquire or develop new properties for
conservation or recreational purposes. Id. at 211, 584 A.2d 78889. The court maintained that the evolution of the Green Acres
Act manifested the legislature's intent to both increase the
amount of land devoted to conservation or recreational use and
to encourage the preservation of existing properties. Id. at 21314, 584 A.2d at 789-90.
Justice Handler continued by reviewing the statutory language of the Green Acres Act and professed that the "plain language" of the act clearly encompassed Mathis Plaza. Id. at 210,
584 A.2d at 788. The majority reasoned that the Borough fulfilled the statutory requirement that the property be "held by"
the Borough, as that provision had been interpreted to mean municipal possession, ownership, and control. Id. (citation omitted). The critical issue, the majority asserted, was whether the
Borough held Mathis Plaza "for such purposes" as recreation or
conservation. Id.
The justice then reviewed section 47b and concluded that
the provision fulfilled the Green Acres Act purposes of increasing the land devoted to conservation and recreation, while preserving those lands already devoted to such use. Id. at 211-12,
584 A.2d at 788-89. Additionally, Justice Handler recounted the
statutory definition for recreation and conservation purposes and
concluded that any municipal property which was used for camping, fishing, boating, and similar public recreational uses at the
time of receipt of a Green Acres grant would be required to obtain state approval prior to its transfer. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:8A-37(f) (West 1979)). While the majority found that
Mathis Plaza had been "held for such purposes," the court conceded that the statute was subject to differing interpretations and
concluded that further statutory interpretation was required. Id.
at 210-11, 584 A.2d at 788.
The majority continued by asserting that its interpretation of
the statute could be supplemented by analyzing how the responsible state agency had implemented the statute. Id. at 212, 584
A.2d at 789. The justice posited that the language used by the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in its grant allocation agreements was "roughly synonymous" with the statutory
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provision. Id. Hence, Justice Handler determined that the
court's position was in accordance with how the DEP had interpreted the restraint provision. Id.
Justice Handler rejected Stanzione's argument that an official declaration by the municipality to dedicate the land for the
purposes of recreation or conservation was necessary to render
the sale subject to state approval. Id. at 214, 584 A.2d at 790.
The court found no justification for such a position in the statute,
its legislative history, nor the DEP's interpretation of the statute.
Id. Further, the majority explained that such an interpretation
would impede the legislative goal to increase the land allocated
for conservation or recreation purposes. Id. The focus on the
actual use of the property, the justice stated, was the correct interpretation of the legislative and administrative intent. Id.
Thus, the court concluded, even an official declaration that a particular property be dedicated to non-conservation or non-recreational purposes would not obviate the requirement for state
approval of the sale. Id. at 214, 584 A.2d at 790. The majority
emphasized that the property's actual use at the time of receipt of
Green Acres funds, and not the Borough's designation of the
land's use, was the dispositive factor. Id.
Justice Handler dismissed the appellate court's concerns
about the potential impact of a broad reading of the statute,
deeming them too attenuated to prevent an interpretation that
would further the state's interest in protecting and preserving
conservation and recreational properties. Id. at 215, 584 A.2d at
790. The majority claimed that the appellate court's concern for
non-compliance with Green Acres grant application procedures,
especially the inventory list, was ill-placed because neither the
DEP nor the legislature intended that the inventory list be wholly
controlling. Id. at 215, 584 A.2d at 790-91. The majority attested that the DEP could not place much reliance upon the inventories of existing recreation and conservation property which
municipalities submitted with the grant application simply because the DEP could not possibly verify the accuracy of the information. Id. at 215, 584 A.2d at 790-9 1. Thus, Justice Handler
asserted, to place absolute reliance upon the municipality's
designation of its property and to preclude challenges to omissions or errors on the inventory list would frustrate the purposes
of the statute. Id., 584 A.2d at 791. The lower court's concern
that municipalities would be discouraged from applying for
Green Acres funds was also remote, Justice Handler asserted, be-
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cause the number of applications currently exceed the program's
monetary resources. Id. at 216, 584 A.2d at 791.
The majority dismissed the lower court's finding that a municipality would be forced to bar the casual public use of recreational land in order to preserve the land as non-recreational or
non-conservational. Id. at 216-17, 584 A.2d at 791. The court
reasoned that the facts of the case did not support a finding that
there was casual public use. Id. While the statute could not be
construed as applicable in instances where the public use was casual and without the permission or knowledge of the municipality,
the justice found that the Borough had actively and openly supported the recreational use of Mathis Plaza. Id. at 217, 584 A.2d
at 791.
The court decreed that where commercial development of
municipal property remained wholly executory when the Green
Acres funds were received, then the actual recreational or conservation use of the property at that time, with the Borough's approval, rendered the property "held by" the Borough for
purposes of section 47b restraint on alienation. Id. at 217-18,
584 A.2d at 792. Relevant factors in the "actual use" analysis,
Justice Handler expounded, included the municipality's knowledge, support, or encouragement of the public use and whether
the municipality had taken official action to enable the property
to be used for recreation or conservation purposes. Id. at 217,
584 A.2d at 792. Hence, the court ruled, the transfer of Mathis
Plaza to Stanzione was subject to section 47b of the Green Acres
Act and was invalid because state approval of the transfer was not
obtained. Id. at 218, 584 A.2d at 792.
Justice Garibaldi, in a lengthy dissent, criticized the majority
for exceeding the legislature's intent and for creating an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Id. at 219-20, 227-28, 584 A.2d
at 792, 796-97 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi reasoned that the majority would find that a municipality held property for conservational or recreational purposes whenever the
property had been used for those purposes with the authorization or condonation of the municipality. Id. at 219, 584 A.2d at
793 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the
statute, the legislative history, and the public policy surrounding
the Green Acres Act indicated the intent of section 47b was not
to restrict the alienability of municipal lands which were held primarily for commercial development when Green Acres funds
were received, despite the occasional public use of the land for
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recreational purposes. Id. at 221, 584 A.2d at 792 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
The justice began the analysis by asserting that a legislature
was presumed to be knowledgeable of administrative practices
and regulations utilized to implement statutory directives. Id. at
221, 584 A.2d at 793 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). But in enacting the 1975 amendments, the dissent observed, the legislature rejected the language utilized by the DEP
in the administration of the program, "[land] used for recreational
purposes," in favor of the more restrictive "[land] held by local
units for recreation and conservation purposes." Id. (emphasis
in original). The different language was significant, Justice Garibaldi argued, because it manifested the legislature's intent to replace the concept of use with that of possession and ownership.
Id. Additionally, the justice expounded, the grant agreement between the DEP and the Borough, restricting alienation of lands
"owned, dedicated or maintained" for conservation or recreation
purposes, further supported the finding that more than infrequent recreational use was required to invoke the section 47b restriction on alienation. Id. at 222, 584 A.2d at 794 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent asserted that the proper analysis for determining when property was "held" for recreational or conservational
purposes required ascertaining the municipality's intentions. Id.
at 202, 222, 584 A.2d at 794 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice
Garibaldi maintained that the Borough's zoning and land use
plans, which designated the land as a commercial area, in conjunction with the Borough's attempts to lease the property for its
"highest and best use" as a commercial development, overwhelmingly supported the finding that the Borough did not hold
Mathis Plaza for recreational or conservational use when the
Green Acres funds were received in 1978. Id. at 223-24, 584
A.2d at 795-96 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent
found it nonsensical that the Borough would hold Mathis Plaza as
recreational lands and forego the potential multi-million dollar
income from the property in return for a mere $27,500 Green
Acres grant. Id. at 223, 584 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi pointed out that even the parties conceded the Borough had, in good faith, not listed Mathis Plaza on
the Green Acres inventory list of recreational lands because the
Borough did not consider Mathis Plaza to be recreation or conservation land. Id. at 224, 584 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi, J., dissent-
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ing). The dissent concluded that the overwhelming evidence of
the Borough's intent to develop Mathis Plaza as a commercial
area, despite the intermittent and sporadic recreational use, removed Mathis Plaza from the section 47b restraint on alienation
of recreation or conservation lands without state approval. Id. at
224-25, 584 A.2d at 795-96 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Noting that in some instances a municipality's intentions
may be ambiguous and evidence may be lacking as to the municipality's commercial development intent at the time a Green Acres
grant is received, Justice Garibaldi proposed that the correct inquiry in such cases requires discerning the municipality's "primary purpose" for holding the property. Id. 122 NJ. at 225, 584
A.2d at 796 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The "primary purpose"
analysis would be fact specific, the dissent asserted, and would
require evaluation of the municipality's official actions regarding
the property, including the property's zoning and land use plan
designation, as well as the property's designation in any Green
Acres inventory listing. Id. at 226, 584 A.2d at 796 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting). Other factors to be considered, Justice Garibaldi
enumerated, include the municipality's attempts to commercially
develop the property, in addition to the nature and extent of the
public's recreational use of the land. Id. Conceding that a "primary purpose" analysis was not a "bright line" test, the dissent
posited that such an analysis would further the Green Acres Act
policies of expanding the lands available for recreational and
conservational use, while allowing casual and sporadic public recreational activity on the municipal land. Id.
Identifying flaws in the majority's reasoning, the dissent asserted that while there existed a general rule against restraints on
the alienation of real property, courts previously acknowledged
that exceptions to the general rule would be upheld if the restraints were reasonable. Id. at 226-27, 584 A.2d at 796 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The majority's broad
ruling unreasonably restrained the alienability of all four lots of
Mathis Plaza, the justice asserted, when two of the lots had always
been used for commercial use and the remaining two lots had
been held by the Borough for commercial development. Id. at
227, 584 A.2d at 796-97 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The justice
further criticized the majority for promulgating a "vague and
unarticulated" standard and for failing to specify the actions required by municipalities to ensure that property held for commercial development would not be deemed recreational or
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conservation properties because of occasional public recreational
use. Id. at 227-28, 584 A.2d at 797 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Justice Garibaldi observed that many municipalities need money
and, given the current weak economy, were holding properties
for future economic development. Id. at 227, 584 A.2d at 797
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The majority's decision, the dissent
posited, required that those municipalities contemplating Green
Acres grants preclude any use of municipal land held for future
commercial use or suffer an economic loss by transferring the
property for less than its future value prior to applying for Green
Acres funds. Id. (emphasis added). Those alternatives, Justice
Garibaldi lamented, frustrate the purposes of the Green Acres
Act and result in a net loss to the community. Id.
In its expansive holding in Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has done much to strike fear deep in
the hearts of those town council members whose municipalities
have received Green Acres funds. In promulgating its "actual
use" interpretation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A-47b (West 1979),

the court ruled that any municipal property which was "actually
used" by the public for recreational or conservation purposes at
the time the municipality received any Green Acres funding is
now subject to what is essentially a state veto power on the transfer or sale of the property. True to its professed mission, the
court has inexorably furthered the Green Acres Act's purpose of
expanding the amounts of real property dedicated to recreation
and conservation.
The court's advancement of the Green Acres program, however, has been at the expense of those people who were meant to
benefit from the Green Acres Act. The court has, with a single
stroke of the pen, potentially removed from a municipality's assets the most valuable and plentiful asset the municipality may
own; its real property. Thus municipalities which have received
Green Acres funds may now be faced with the startling realization that some of the valuable real estate which the township had
been holding for commercial development, but on which was allowed casual public use, is now subject to state approval prior to
the property's sale. Given the DEP's response in Cedar Cove, it is
evident that the state's approval of a sale may not always be
forthcoming. Additionally, the burden of compensating the municipalities for the lost revenue will fall on the supposed beneficiaries of the Green Acres Act, namely the public.
Justice Garibaldi's proposed "primary purpose" analysis,
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while concededly not a "bright line" rule, provides a more equitable result. By focusing on the municipality's primary purpose
in holding the land, public use of the land for recreational or
conservational purposes may be allowed while the municipality
waits to maximize the potential income from the property. Both
the municipality and the public gain, the former by attaining a
better price for its asset (and reducing the burden on the taxpayer), and the latter by having more land on which to recreate.
The legislature's concern for municipal fraud and abuse of the
Green Acres program can be controlled just as easily via the dissent's more equitable legal standard than as under the majority's
harsh rule.
Granted, the actual ramifications of the Cedar Cove decision
cannot be ascertained at this early stage. Many municipalities
will probably be unaware of the possible complications to their
next sale of municipal property until an action is brought on "actual use" grounds to rescind the sale. At a minimum, the court's
vague and ambiguous test has muddied the legal waters, and is
sure to spur litigation to determine the scope of the "actual use"
test. Given a municipality's potential loss of income in these trying economic times ($300,000 in Cedar Cove), the supreme court's
decision invites a legislative response to its holding.
John W. Verlaque

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW-STRICT LIABILITY-PREDECESSOR IN

TITLE STRICTLY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM CONTAMINATION ON OWNER'S PROPERTY BASED

MALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY DOCTRINE -

ON THE ABNOR-

T & E Industries v.

Safety Light Corp., 123 N.J. 371, 587 A.2d 1249 (1991).
From 1917 to 1926, United States Radium Corporation
(USRC) processed radium at an industrial site in Orange, New
Jersey. 123 N.J. at 376, 587 A.2d at 1252. The radium processing
operation generated a solid radioactive by-product known as
"tailings." USRC disposed the tailings on unimproved portions
of the site. In 1943, USRC sold the site to Arpin, a plastics manufacturer. Id. at 379, 587 A.2d at 1253. The property changed
hands several times between 1943 and 1974 when T & E, an elec-
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tronic component manufacturer, purchased the site. In 1979, the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) inspected the site and detected radiation in the building and soil
beneath the building that exceeded both federal and state standards. Based on recommendations made by the DEP and T & E's
own expert, T & E implemented interim remedial measures. Id.
at 380, 587 A.2d at 1253-54. In 1981, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) placed the site on the National Priorities List
pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)(CERCLA). T & E Indus., 123 N.J. at 380, 587 A.2d at
1254. Subsequently, T & E ceased its operations at the site due
to health risks resulting from the contamination and moved to
another site in Orange, New Jersey.
Evidence adduced at trial indicated that as early as 1917 employees at USRC were becoming suspicious of the potential
health risks associated with radium. Id. at 377, 587 A.2d at 1252.
Between 1917 and 1978, when the federal government began to
regulate the disposal of tailings, both USRC and the scientific
community were accumulating data that indicated the potential
health risks associated with radium and its radioactive elements.
Id. at 376-79, 587 A.2d at 1252-53. Despite its understanding of
the health risks posed by radium, however, USRC failed to notify
any subsequent owners of its past disposal practices at the site.
Id. at 382, 587 A. 2d at 1255.
The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the theory
that the doctrine of caveat emptor barred T & E's recovery. Id. at
383, 587 A.2d at 1255. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed holding that USRC's disposal activities
were, as a matter of law, abnormally dangerous and therefore
USRC was strictly liable for damages. Id. The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision as modified and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 402, 587 A.2d 1265.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Clifford initially determined that a property owner can assert a strict liability cause
of action against a predecessor in title based on the abnormally
dangerous activity doctrine. Id. at 384-90, 587 A.2d at 1256-59.
The court noted that although the abnormally dangerous activity
doctrine arose in a situation involving adjacent property owners,
the policy considerations underlying the doctrine support its application to predecessors in title. Id. at 386, 587 A.2d at 1257.
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The policy considerations identified by the court include the reasoning that "enterprise[s] should bear the costs of accidents attributable to highly dangerous [or unusual activities]" and that
the enterprise is in "a better position to administer the unusual
risk by passing it on to the public." Id. at 387, 587 A.2d at 1257
(quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER
& KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 551 (5th ed. 1984)).
The court then held that the doctrine of caveat emptor should
not act to bar T & E's cause of action. Id. at 387, 587 A.2d at
1257. Although caveat emptor is still a valid doctrine in New
Jersey, the court noted that several exceptions to the rule have
developed. Id. at 387-88, 587 A.2d at 1257. Relying on an enterprise liability rationale, the court held that an exception to the
doctrine of caveat emptor exists when a seller "has engaged in an
abnormally-dangerous [sic] activity and disposed of the by-products of that activity onto the property [and then] markets the
land." Id. at 389, 587 A.2d at 1258. In addition, the court noted
that the risk of damages arising from an abnormally dangerous
activity can be assumed by the buyer. Id. at 390, 587 A.2d at
1258. According to the court, however, the use of an "as is" contract such as the one in the case at hand does not satisfy the
court's requirement that the buyer knowingly and voluntarily assume the risk. Id. at 390, 587 A.2d at 1259.
Upon approving the application of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to this case, the court established certain elements that identify such an activity. Id. The court noted that
the determination of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous
must be applied on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 391, 587 A.2d
at 1259. To determine whether an activity is abnormallydangerous, the court relied on the six factors set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). Id. at 390, 587
A.2d at 1259. In applying these factors, the court held that "despite the usefulness of radium, defendant's processing, handling,
and disposal of that substance under the facts of this case constituted an abnormally-dangerous [sic] activity." Id. at 394, 587
A.2d at 1261. In addition, the court noted that it was not necessary to determine whether knowledge was an element in determining an enterpriser's liability. Id. at 392, 587 A.2d at 1260.
The court avoided this issue by holding that if knowledge is a
requirement, USRC had constructive knowledge of the inherently dangerous nature of its activities. Id. at 392-95, 587 A.2d at
1260-61.

1168

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

The court granted a declaratory judgment holding the defendant liable for necessary cleanup costs as they are incurred. Id.
at 398, 587 A.2d at 1263. In addition, the court held that T & E
was entitled to recover damages for all "losses or injuries proximately caused by a defendant's acts." Id. at 399, 587 A.2d at
1263. Therefore, T & E was entitled to compensation for all
losses caused by the defendant's disposal of radium contaminated tailings. Id. The court limited the damages, however, by
expressly precluding recovery for the value of the time T & E's
president spent managing the contamination problem. Id. at
399-400, 587 A.2d at 1263-64.
The T & E decision clarifies the doctrines of caveat emptor and
abnormally dangerous activities by requiring a case-by-case analysis of specifically enumerated factors. As a result, the court has
espoused an equitable method for assessing damages for contamination caused by a distant predecessor in title. The holding,
however, is limited because the use of a hazardous or toxic substance does not make the activity abnormally dangerous as a matter of law. In addition, by reserving the issue of knowledge, the
court has left unresolved the question of whether or not a defendant without actual or constructive knowledge can be held
strictly liable under the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine.
Therefore, the court has left the door open to further challenges
to the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine in relation to hazardous waste sites.
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